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Little is known about the mechanisms through which additional police resources
reduce crime. Criminals may perceive the increased risk of being caught and be
deterred, or they may be arrested at higher rates; preventing them from committing
additional crimes while incarcerated. This study sheds light on the mechanisms using
individual-level crime data. It documents that shift changes of police patrols disrupt
police activity and lower the likelihood of clearing crimes and arresting perpetrators
by about 30 percent. Strong evidence of repeat oending implies that arrests lead
to subsequent incapacitation. The aggregate-level relationship between crime rates
and clearance rates is in line with sizable incapacitation eects.
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1 Introduction
The United States and the European Union both spend about one percent of their GDP
on public police services. Police expenditures represent 55 percent of all government
expenditures on public order and safety, with re protection services, law courts, prisons,
and R&D absorbing the rest of the budget.1
Whether the money is well spent depends on the marginal benets of an extra dollar
allocated to police resources. In an attempt to measure such benets researchers have long
examined the relationship between policing and crime. Yet, there is still surprisingly little
consensus on whether and how more policing reduces crime (see Carriaga and Worrall,
2015).
In recent years empirical economists have contributed to this literature producing
compelling evidence on a negative relationship between police levels and crime. See,
among others, Corman and Mocan (2000), Evans and Owens (2007), Levitt (1997), and
Chaln and McCrary (2018).2 The mechanism behind this relationship is still unclear,
and has recently been called a black box (Cook et al., 2011, Durlauf and Nagin, 2011).
A better understanding of the mechanisms is crucial to determine the benets of
policing, as the two channels that could be at work, incapacitation and deterrence, have
dierent implications for public spending. More police forces might help clearing more
crimes, which would lead to more arrests and convictions, hence incapacitating arrested
individuals from committing other crimes, for as long as they are in custody. A neces-
sary condition for the presence of incapacitation is that additional policing increases the
likelihood that after committing an oense people are put in custody. This generates
additional expenditures for law courts and prisons, which have to be factored in when
evaluating the cost of policing.
The presence of additional police might also lead to an increase in the perceived risk of
arrest, deterring criminals from committing the crime altogether. Deterrence, which has
been the focus of seminal contributions in the economics of crime literature (see Becker,
1968, Ehrlich, 1973), has the attractive feature of avoiding additional expenditures in law
courts and prisons.
Since incapacitation and deterrence are so intertwined it has been challenging to con-
vincingly separate one from the other. This paper moves one step back. Even though both
1See Kyckelhahn (2011) and the Government expenditure on public order and safety report published
by EUROSTAT http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/.
2In contrast, a large criminological literature has generally failed to nd signicant impacts of police
on crime, even in quasi-experimental studies (see Sherman, 2002, Skogan and Frydl, 2004, for an overview
of such evidence). Sherman and Weisburd (1995) represents a notable exception.
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mechanisms hinge on how additional police patrolling changes the likelihood of clearing
crimes (to generate deterrence and incapacitation additional policing has to increase the
perceived and the actual risk of arrest, respectively), there is very little evidence on such
a mechanism.3 The main empirical challenge when dealing with the mechanism has been
that clearances are equilibrium outcomes in a game involving police ocers and criminals
(Cook, 1979).4
The primary aim of this study is to provide micro-level evidence on whether more
policing increases the likelihood that a crime is cleared. This is not a settled issue, as many
criminologists would argue that prompt police presence has little impact on clearances
(see, among others, Sherman, 2013, Skogan et al., 2004, Weisburd and Eck, 2004).
I use the universe of commercial robberies in Milan between January 2009 and June
2011 together with quasi-experimental variation in policing to deal with endogeneity is-
sues: Italian cities are patrolled by two police forces, and each force has exclusive control
over specic quadrants of the city. These quadrants rotate every shift change (about every
six hours), forcing police cars to make arduous and disruptive trips across the city. The
evidence as well as informal conversations with police ocers reveal a link between such
disruptions and clearances, especially when the diversion is severe and police cars have to
travel long distances.
Robberies that take place far away from the police headquarters, which is where police
cars start and end their shift, are considerably less likely to be cleared (-30 percent), but
only around shift changes.
Do criminals exploit the timing of shift changes? Section 5 addresses in great detail
the response of criminals. The analysis is based on the choice of time and location of
robberies, on the selection of robbers during shift change periods, and on the dynamic
behavior of robbers. There is no evidence that during shift changes robbers are more
likely to target businesses which are located away from the headquarters, and therefore
are less likely to be patrolled. The institutional detail as well as the evidence suggests
that the diversion is not salient enough to generate an endogenous response of criminals.
3A few papers have used clearance rates as a measure of productivity of police departments (Garicano
and Heaton, 2010, Mas, 2006).
4About thirty years ago a few papers analyzed clearances (Carr-Hill and Stern, 1973, Craig, 1987,
Mathur, 1978, Thaler, 1977, Wolpin, 1978). Using simultaneous equations models with non-testable
identication restrictions, most of these papers nd support for the existence of both deterrence and
incapacitation. In particular, in Thaler (1977) individual crime-level clearance rates, similar to the ones
used in this study, are shown to respond strongly to changes in the number of police ocers. The issue is
that such deployment is likely to be endogenous. In the criminology literature little evidence is found of
an eect of policing on clearance rates (Cordner, 1989, Skogan and Frydl, 2004), but again deployment
of police forces is likely to be endogenous.
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This paper is related to recent studies that exploit changes in highly visible and pre-
dominantly static police deployment following terrorist attacks (Di Tella and Schargrod-
sky, 2004, Draca et al., 2011, Klick and Tabarrok, 2005, Machin and Marie, 2011). These
are ideal conditions to measure deterrence, and all four papers observe localized and
abrupt changes in crime rates.5 Focussing on a dierent but common type of polic-
ing, automobile patrolling, complements these studies.6 The most closely related paper,
Blanes i Vidal and Kirchmaier (2017), exploits exogenous variation in police response
times, showing that increased response times lower the likelihood that a crime is solved
and the perpetrators are put in custody. And as in Blanes i Vidal and Kirchmaier (2017),
I nd no evidence that criminals exploit potentially predictable policing patterns.
Finally, I discuss how the relationship between policing and clearances generates a pe-
culiar pattern between crime and clearances. When more policing increases the likelihood
of clearing and arresting oenders, and there are numerous repeat oenders, crime rates
become inversely proportional to clearance rates, implying that the elasticity of crime
with respect to policing equals the negative elasticity of clearance rates with respect to
policing. Province level scatter plots of crime rates against clearance rates are consistent
with important incapacitation eects.
2 The Quasi-experiment
Italy has two police forces, the Polizia and the Carabinieri that share the same functions
and objectives, but are, by all means, two separate entities.7 Separate ministries oversee
their activities and they have separate emergency telephone numbers (112 and 113). Fig-
ure 1) shows the location of the two headquarters, located in the very city center, a few
hundred yards from each other. The map displays the exact location of each commercial
robbery that happened in Milan by the intervening force. Each square and each plus
sign represents a dierent victimized commercial business that has been (quasi-randomly)
assigned to, respectively, the Carabineri and to the Polizia, according to the following
rule.
5A set of studies in criminology uses random changes in patrols to test the eectiveness of police
forces. Skogan and Frydl (2004) review the criminology literature on the eectiveness of policing. The
studies that evaluate the eect of policing on crime generally nd that crime spikes during strikes. But
strikes are perfectly predictable and known, and when they happen most of the change in crime seems to
be driven by the sudden and complete lack of deterrence.
6According to recent policing statistics nearly 7 in 10 local police ocers had regular patrolling duties,
and almost all U.S. local police departments use regularly scheduled automobile patrols (Reaves, 2011).
7The Carabinieri were the royal police force, the gendarmerie, and despite the 1945 referendum that
ended the monarchy in favor of the republic, they were not dismantled.
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Each force is responsible for keeping law and order in a dierent part of the city. For
police deployment purposes the city is divided into three areas, North-West, North-East,
and South; the Southern area is the largest, covering between 40 and 50 percent of the
city and 43 percent of the robberies (another 34 percent of the robberies happen in the
North-Eastern part of the city and the rest in the North-Western part). At any given
point in time one area is under the control of the Carabinieri, and two under the control
of the Polizia.
Such assignments rotate clockwise about every six hours, in concert with shift changes.
The 911 operators forward the call to the assigned police force depending on the exact
time of the call and the exact location of the crime. Incoming patrols operate up to the
hour, and outgoing ones operate past the hour. At any given point in time either the
incoming or the outgoing car is formally on duty, which sets a limit to the total number
of active patrols which are ready to arrest culprits. In order to reduce the complexity of
the assignments procedure, there are no attempts to accommodate delays.8
Police patrols that are nishing their shift head for the headquarters, while police
patrols that are starting their shift drive from the headquarters towards the area they
have been assigned. With two forces, three areas, and four 6-hour shifts within a given
day, the Carabinieri cover the same area during the same 6-hour shift only every three
days. This induces quasi-random variation in the days of the month, days of the week, and
6-hour shift in the geographic coverage of police forces. Inside each area there are about
7 to 10 cars that cover around 120 square kilometers (40 square miles). The rotation
mechanism is clearly visible in Figure 2. Each panel represents a map of robberies in a
day/shift combination. Since there are three areas and four shifts there are a total of 12
combinations.9 In days of type 1 (top row) the Carabinieri start patrolling the North-
Western part of the city at midnight, move to the North-Eastern part at 7am, then move
to the Southern part at 1pm, and nish the day back in the North-Eastern neighborhoods.
The other two types of days the Carabinieri start the rotation in the other two sectors.
The Polizia follows specular moves.
It is obvious that the rotation induces time-consuming trips across the city, and institu-
tional rules try to reduce the potential for disruption. The most important one prescribes
that changes should occur directly on the street at the hour sharp. But in order to have
8To assess the importance of the lack of coordination across the two police forces and the resultant
lack of continuity of control over a territory, later I exploit the fact that the Polizia retains control in one
of the three rotating areas.
9Outliers in the recurrent pattern are driven by ocers who are part of the smaller non-rotating Polizia
or Carabinieri forces. The neighborhood police forces, the mobile forces, and the motor-bikers follow a
dierent shift: 8am-2pm and 2pm-8pm.
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the shift changes operate on the streets each forces requires twice the number of active
police cars (one for the outgoing force and one for the incoming one). Unfortunately Milan
police union members complain that for about 50 percent of the incoming cars there are
no outgoing cars available (Biondini, 2011, Editorial Oce, 2011, Garofalo, 2013, see).
When an extra car is missing the shift has to be performed inside the headquarters, as
ocers working in subsequent shifts share the same police car. The Polizia calls them
car on car shift changes (macchina su macchina). Car availability is on a rst come
rst serve basis.10 Since the sequence of the incoming forces is unpredictable, so is the
location that is going to be subject to a car on car shift change.
The degree of disruption depends on the time it takes to drive from the headquarters
to the site of potential victims. While the switching of the crews inside the headquarters
is likely to be quick, Google Map estimates that it takes on average 15 minutes to drive
from the assigned neighborhood to the headquarters (see Table 1).
Summing up, shift changes may disrupt police patrolling, especially if there is an
insucient number of police cars. Whenever the shift change happens according to the
law the number of visible police cars may actually increase, and since criminals cannot
distinguish active from inactive patrols, shift changes might actually increase deterrence.
When, instead, a shift change happens inside the headquarters, for a few minutes the
neighborhood might be completely unpatrolled. Delays of either the incoming (the patrols
might be in the middle of a task) or the outgoing cars (the car might be broken, or the
ocers might be late, or, more simply, streets might be congested), could either increase
deterrence or additionally disrupt policing depending on the availability of overlapping
cars.11
I use the exact time of the robbery and the exact distance from the headquarters
measured in driving time to predict whether the incoming or the outgoing police patrol
could have reached the victimized commercial business on time. Information about the
switching of the areas of deployment, as well as on the exact time of robberies and the exact
distance between robbed businesses and the police headquarters, allows me to estimate the
eect of disrupting police patrolling on a binary variable measuring whether the robbery
has been solved (meaning that at least one arrest has been made).12
10According to private conversations I had with police ocers, the location of car on car shift changes
are not chosen strategically.
11According to a contractual agreement the extra minutes spent on the street during overlapping police
patrolling are unpaid.
12According to the Milan Polizia clearing a robbery means that at least one robber has been identied,
which leads to an arrest. But most times the identied oender chooses to collaborate with the police
identifying his fellow oendersto receive sentence reductions. For this reason I use clearances and arrests
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Crime reductions that are driven by localized changes in policing, whether driven by
deterrence or incapacitation, may generate not just immediate but also cumulative eects,
with gradual, spatially diused, and potentially hard to identify reductions in the amount
of crime.13
The advantage of measuring the relationship between clearances (in essence arrests)
and policing, is that disruptions should have immediate eects that can be linked to
specic locations, allowing for a more designated identication strategy.
2.1 Main Threats to Identication
The main identication threat is that the time of the shift changes is recurrent and thus
predictable. The public is uniformed about the shift and rotation mechanism, yet it is
hard to completely rule out the possibility that some professional robbers may be aware
of it. What is unpredictable is whether there is a shortage of police cars, and when and
where such shortage disrupts policing.
An additional threat is that the shifts happen always at the same time, and those times
may have features that are correlated with police productivity: businesses may be closing,
trac may be heavy, it may still be dark around 7am or already dark at 7pm. While
these feature can be measured and be controlled for, it could also be that police ocers
are tired from nishing their shift, or are not fully operational at the very beginning of
their shift.
To address these concerns it is important not just to use the time variation driven
by shift changes, but to interact such variation with the distance from the police head-
quarters. The advantage of this dierence-in-dierences strategy is that it controls for
any unobserved factors that inuence the optimal timing of robberies (like those men-
tioned in the previous paragraph) as long as these do not depend on the distance from
the headquarters (see Section 5).
Moreover, such interactions are ideal tests for selection. An excess mass of robberies
against commercial business that are located far from the headquarters during a shift
change would be evidence that robbers exploit shift changes, and that shift changes gen-
erate negative deterrence. The formal test is a dierence-in-dierences in the number of
robberies depending on location (below/above median distance from the headquarters)
as synonymous.
13For example, the Online Figure 14 shows that groups of robbers tend to operate in selected parts of
the city. These clusters tend to be quite large, as robbers sometimes operate across the entire city. This
implies that arresting robbers in one part of the city would lower crimes in many more locations.
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and time (shift change status) of the robbery. This is the simplest and yet most powerful
test for whether criminals are aware of the vulnerability of law enforcement during shift
changes.
The data also allow for a whole battery of additional tests that for brevity can be
found in the Online Appendix A.3. Selection that is driven by knowledgable and smart
robbers would typically produce positive answers to some of the following questions: Is
the modus operandi of robberies that happen during shift changes dierent from all the
others?14 Are able robbers, dened as those who are more unpredictable and, therefore,
more successful, more likely to target businesses during shift changes? Does controlling
for the experience of robbers, measured by the number of successful robberies, alter the
results? Are robbers who happened to commit a robbery during a shift change (and thus
might have learned about the deciencies in policing) more likely to do so again in their
subsequent robbery? Do the ndings dier when focussing on robbers who for the rst
time happen to perform a robbery during a shift change, and therefore are less likely to
have deliberately chosen such periods? These tests are increasingly able to detect whether
at least some robbers are aware of the disruptive power of shift changes.
3 Milan Crime Data
The area under study, which comprises the municipality of Milan (Comune) as well as
part of the smaller neighboring municipalities around it (Provincia) has a population of
close to 1.5 million. The land area under study is close to 350 square kilometers (134
square miles).15 Milan, like many historical European cities (e.g. Rome, Paris, London,
etc.) has irregular city blocks and a highly chaotic network of streets.
For investigative purposes the anti-robbery Polizia department of Milan collects in-
formation on individual robberies and robbers (not yet for the other crimes). After each
robbery, even those assigned to the Carabinieri, the Polizia collects all kinds of informa-
tion about the perpetrators, the victim, the loot, etc.16
The Polizia complements the information contained in patrol reports surveying the
14The most intuitive way to test whether there is such a selection is to perform a balance test depending
on the time of the robbery. In Mastrobuoni (2011) I show that more able bank robbers tend to get larger
hauls with specic modus operandi (e.g. they are more likely to use rearms). Thus, one would expect
robberies that happen during shift changes to be associated with larger hauls.
15Aggregate crime rates and clearance rates show that within Italy the city does not represent an outlier
(see Figure 10.
16The Polizia force does not record the exact locations of police cars in every moment in time (such
data would not just be dicult to store but also quite hard to analyze).
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victims, and collecting any available information that is recorded by nearby surveillance
cameras. Their main purposes are i) to identify recurrent perpetrators in order to predict
their future oenses, and ii) to provide prosecutors with forensic evidence. This method
is known as predictive policing.
While in the absence of victimization surveys of commercial businesses exact victims'
reporting rates cannot be computed, according to police investigations these are close to
100 percent. Evidence of this is based on criminals' confessions. Since most robbers are
caught in agrante delicto they have an incentive to plead guilty in order to receive a
1/3 sentencing reduction (patteggiamento). According to the Polizia only in one instance
did an arrestee confess a robbery that had not been reported (later the business owner
acknowledged that he had not having reported the crime). Businesses might be aware
that the only way to increase police patrolling in their neighborhood is by reporting the
crime.17
3.1 Summary Statistics
I have been given access to a subset of the variables used by the Polizia to predict the
crimes between January 2008 and June 2011. The many variables that describe in great
detail the physical appearance of robbers were not added to the dataset, while those that
describe the modus operandi of the robbers were added.
In the data each observation is a separate robbery, and 353 happen within 15 minutes
of a shift change. The remaining 1,814 do not. The 16 percent of robberies that fall within
those 30 minute periods are higher than what a uniform distribution would predict, which
is going to be discussed in great detail when testing for deterrence (Section 5).
The summary statistics by shift change status are shown in Table 1. Shift change
status is a 0/1 variable that measures the change in shift 15 minutes before up to 15
minutes after the beginning of a shift; for example, 6.45am-7.15am around the start of
the 7am-1pm shift. The likelihood of clearing a robbery (by means of an arrest) during
a shift change is 9.1 percent, while it is 14.8 percent during the rest of the day. The
third group of columns shows that this raw dierence is signicant at the 1 percent level.
The only other variables that dier signicantly are the fraction of robberies that happen
during the 30 minutes that precede the shops' closing time. Since the exact opening
hours of each business are not known, I use two proxies for the closing times. I divide
businesses into 23 homogenous categories and take the maximum and the 90th percentile
17On top of this, businesses often need a police report for insurance purposes.
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of the observed time of the robberies.18 While a few businesses close around the 7pm
shift change (bakeries and jewelers), most close around 8pm, which is why the dierence
tends to be negative. When exploiting the dierences between business that are far away
or close to the headquarters these dierences disappear.
The Polizia uses information taken from surveillance cameras together with very de-
tailed descriptions by the victims about the robbers to link oenders across robberies. The
Serial robbers variable identies robbers who have been linked (70 percent of robberies
are linked to such serial robbers). Figure 3 shows a screen-shot of the software used to
reconstruct such series. The variable Number of the series" indexes the robberies that
are linked with each other in a chronological manner. Such number is later used as a
proxy for experience.
The Police variable indicates whether the Polizia handled that particular robbery.
While the city is divided into 3 parts and the Polizia is responsible for 2 parts, the
fraction of robberies that is handled by the Polizia is slightly larger than expected (73
against 67 percent). Before 2010 the Polizia was using a predictive policing software called
Keycrime to catch serial robbers, a software which was later shared with the Carbinieri.
A few additional variables describe the modus operandi of the robberies, as well as the
value of the stolen loot. Notice that the variables that are assumed to signal ability, like
loot, or the use of rearms (see Mastrobuoni, 2011) do not seem to vary depending on
the shift change status, indicating that more able robbers are not targeting those periods
(additional tests for deterrence, based on the entire distribution of the loot are shown in
Section 5).
4 The Eect of Disrupted Policing on Clearance Rates
4.1 Simple Dierences
The simplest way to estimate the eect of a shift change on clearing a robbery is to
compute the dierence between the probability of clearing a robbery during a shift change
and the probability of clearing a robbery during the rest of the day.
I take 15 minute periods on each side of the four shift changes Tj, j = 1, ..., 4 (later I
also dene the intervals based on Google's estimated distance between the location of the
robbery and the headquarters). The rst row in the summary statistics Table 1 shows that
the probability of clearing a robbery (the clearance rate) is equal to 9.1 percent during
18The Online Appendix Table 9 shows the individual closing times.
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shift change periods and equal to 14.8 percent otherwise (as in the Summary statistics
table). Such simple dierence, estimated using a linear probability model, is signicant
at the 1 percent level.
But such dierence might be driven by an underlying dierence in clearance rates that
the simple dierence is unable to capture. In order to capture the underlying evolution of
clearances one can estimate the eect on clearing of robbery n perpetrated by the group
of oenders i using the following regression function:19
Yi,n = α + δI(minj|ti,n − Tj| ≤ 15′) + f(ti,n) + x′i,nβ + εi,n, (1)
where I(minj|ti,n−Tj| ≤ 15′) indicates whether the robbery happened within 15 minutes
from a shift change; and, most importantly, f(ti,n) measures the underlying daily evolu-
tion of clearance rates. The other regressors xi,n control for observed characteristics of
robbers and robberies. Given that the time of the day repeats itself every 24 hours this
is the ideal setup to model f(ti,n) using periodic functions. There is a large literature in
mathematics and in statistics on using series of sines and cosines, innite and truncated
Fourier series, to approximate any smooth function.20 Since time repeats itself in cycles
such approximations are even more valuable.21
The underlying evolution of the probability of clearing a case becomes a function
of sines and cosines f(t) =
∑k
j=1(γ0j cos(j × 2πHi,n) + γ1j sin(j × 2πHi,n)), where Hi,n
indicates the time of day standardized to lie between 0 (midnight) and 1 (one minute
before midnight). Based on cross validation the optimal choice for k is equal to 2.22
f(ti,n) is also going to be estimated either using more common simple polynomials in
time or the cubic spline function.
When estimating the dierence-in-dierences model, the shift change dummy is in-
teracted with the distance from the headquarters. Distance is measured in driving time
according to Google, and is dichotomized based on whether such time is below or above
the median time, equal to 15 minutes. Such a dierence-in-dierences strategy controls
19All the regression are estimated using least squares regressions and clustering the standard errors by
group of oenders i.
20A weighted trigonometric series of sines and cosines is called a trigonometric polynomial of order k.
Trigonometric polynomials have been used to approximate functions since Fourier's 1822 The analytical
theory of heat.
21Andrews (1991) shows that under some smoothness conditions a truncated Fourier series estimated
using least squares converges to the true periodic function. While such smoothness conditions do not
apply to clearance dummies the approximations turn out to be good.
22This choice serves a similar role here to the bandwidth parameter for non-parametric kernel estima-
tions. See the Online Appendix Section A.1.
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for any unobserved factors that might drive the choice of the time of the robbery, i.e. the
business hours, the visibility conditions, and other strategies and constraints that depend
on time.
The previous regression can easily be amended to compute placebo eects. Moving
the intervals by d multiples of 30 minutes from the true shift change periods the regression
can estimate placebo shift change eects δd:
Yi,n = α + δ
dI(minj|ti,n − Tj + d · 30′| ≤ 15′) + f(ti,n) + x′i,nβ + εi,n, (2)
where, for example, d = 0 estimates the true eect δ0 = δ, while d = 2 estimates the shift
change eect one hour too early.
Instead of estimating the underlying evolution of clearances f(ti,n), one can use an
event study design. Centering the time measured in hours around the closest shift change
j∗, ei,n = ti,n − Tj∗ , one can simply control for a series of half-hour event time periods.23
Since the shortest shift is 5 hours long (7pm-12am) we dene ve 30' periods on each
side of the shift changes. Excluding a one hour event time period on each side of the
shift change interval the dummy variables in the regressions are 7, corresponding to the
shift change interval, and the shift change interval shifted by negative and positive 2.5, 2,
and 1.5 hours. Dening the set of 30 minute shifts S={-2.5,-2,-1.5,0,1.5,2,2.5}, the event
study regression becomes:
Yi,n = α +
∑
s∈S
βsI(−15′ < ei,n + s · 60′ ≤ 15′) + x′i,nβ + εi,n. (3)
β0 measures the dierence in the probability of clearing a case within the 30 minute shift
change period, and the two one-hour adjacent periods.24
The advantage of the event time model is that all the placebo coecients (s 6= 0)
are estimated at once. If chance was driving the results, the coecient β0 (the true shift
change period) would be similar to many other βss. And, again, one can interact the
shift change dummies with an above median distance from the headquarters dummy to
estimate a dierence-in-dierences.
23Online Figure 16 shows the relationship between the time of the day and the event time.
24The results are robust to the exclusion of longer adjacent time intervals, while choosing a shorter
baseline interval reduces the precision of the estimates leaving the size unchanged.
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4.1.1 Results from The Event Study Design
Starting with the last model, Table 2 shows the estimated coecients of a linear probabil-
ity model of a robbery being cleared modelled as in Equation 3.25 The coecient on the
Shift change interval (SCI) represents the dierence between the likelihood of clearing a
robbery that happened within 15 minutes of a shift change, and one that happened during
the two adjacent one-hour time intervals.
Column 1 does not include additional covariates x, while Column 2 includes the two
variables that failed the balance test.26 Given that the balance test was done only for
the shift change periods, in Column 3 I also include the value of the stolen loot, a Polizia
dummy, a south and a north-west dummy, year by month dummies, day of the week
dummies, a rearm dummy, a knife dummy, a daylight dummy, whether the robbery is
against a bank, and the average number of thefts that are committed within the same 30
minutes.27
Just before and after the shift changes clearance rates are equal to 13.6 percent, and
drop by -4.5 percentage points during shift changes. The only other signicant coecient
(at the 10 percent level) is the one related to the interval that follows by 2 and a half
hours the shift changes. Adding the two variables that failed the randomization test leaves
the shift change coecient almost unchanged, and non of the other 30 minute period is
statistically speaking dierent from zero. In line with the results from the randomization
table when I control for all the additional variables the coecient on the shift change
period remains unchanged. Moreover, controlling for the additional regressors all the
other coecients are precisely estimated to be close to zero.
4.1.2 Results from the Semi-Parametric Dierence Design
Rather than comparing the shift changes to nearby periods, one can use Equation 1 to
compare them to their counterfactual evolution. As mentioned, the underlying evolution
can be modelled using dierent semi-parametric methods, and the hypothesis can be
further tested by generating placebo shift changes δd, d 6= 0.
Controlling for the underlying evolution of clearances, Table 3 shows that using peri-
25Given that in column 1 the covariates are discrete and the model is saturated the conditional expec-
tation functions can be properly parameterized as a the linear model. Using a probit model in all three
specications (Columns 1 to 3) the marginal eects are almost identical to the linear probability case.
26In line with the small dierences shown in the balance test, having no other regressors or adding
additional ones does not alter any of these results.
27Controlling, in addition, for the potentially endogenous predicted (by the victim) age of the robbers
and perceived nationality of the robbers, as well as for their experience does not alter the results.
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odic functions for f(t) the shift change eect is between -4.9 and -5.0 percentage points
(similar to what was found in the event study design). Using a quartic in time or cubic
splines the results are similar.28 Given the better t and the previous discussion the rest
of this study is going to estimate f(t) using either the Fourier series, or the event study
dummies (de facto the nearby time intervals).
The estimated true and placebo shift change coecients δd with the corresponding
95 percent condence intervals are shown in Figure 4. There is a clear reduction in
the coecients around the true shift change, and, in line with the results based on the
event study, the only signicant dierences are around the shift changes. Notice that the
negative coecients at ±30 minutes might be driven by a misclassication of treatment,
as at times it might take more than than 15 minutes to reach a given location. In the next
Section I will exploit the exact time it takes to reach a victimized businesses. Moreover,
since in placebo regressions the truly treated time interval contributes to the underlying
evolution (f(t)), the placebo coecients tend to be larger than zero.
4.2 Dierences-in-Dierences Depending on the Distance from
the HQ
The previous estimates exploit only variation in time, and any unobserved heterogeneity
that is correlated with time might bias the estimates. For example, the 7pm shift change
happens before businesses close and around the time the sun goes down. Both factors
might inuence clearances. Since Polizia and Carabinieri patrols need to drive in and out
of the headquarters, which are located in the city center, businesses located farther away
from center are less protected.
Equations 2 and 3 are amended interacting the 30 minute time interval dummies with
the above median and below median distance dummies. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show
the estimated eects when using the Fourier series and the event time strategy. The two
set of estimates are very similar. During shift changes the reduction in the likelihood
of clearing a case is indeed entirely driven by businesses that are located more than 15
minutes away from the headquarters (the median time to reach a victimized business
according to Google Maps). For brevity I do not include all the interacted event time
dummies, but all those that are not shown are precisely estimated to be close to zero.
The dierence between the shift change eects when the distance is above of below the
28The Online Figure 12 shows that except during the night time, where the sample size is quite small,
the more exible semi-parametric functions are similar to each other. The quartic in time, instead, tends
to oversmooth the series.
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median has a p-value of 5 percent when using the more ecient semi-parametric Fourier
series while it is close to 10 percent when using the less ecient nonparametric event
time model.
Columns 3 and 4 test whether the lack of coordination between incoming and outgoing
patrols is also taking place when the Polizia retains control over an area (I dene such
shifts as one in a retained area),29. There do not seem to be large dierences based on
whether the police forces retains control over an area, showing that lack of coordination
happens also within the Polizia.
It follows from the dierences-in-dierences results by median time that using 15
minutes before and after to dene the intention to treat status might not always be
correct. In order to take the exact distance from the headquarters into account, I dene
whether the police patrol was potentially too far from the crime scene to reach it on time.
I use the actual time τi,n it takes to travel from the headquarters to the crime scene, and
given that Google's estimated durations for Italy do not take trac into account, I inate
the time τi,n by a constant κ ≥ 1 to dene the intention to treat status:"30
I(|ti,n − T | ≤ κτi,n). (4)
Table 5 presents the estimated δs using κ from 1 to 1.5 in increments of 1/10, based
on Fourier regressions (Columns 1 and 2) and on ±1h15m around shift change samples
(Columns 3 and 4). In line with a more precise treatment status, the results are larger
than before. The largest shift change eects are obtained when using κ = 1.2, meaning
that for police patrols Google's estimated travel time is 20 percent lower than the actual
one, or that patrols tend to anticipate the end or delay the start of their shift.
29Given that there are 2 areas out of three that are covered by the Polizia the fraction of such areas is
approximately equal to 30 percent.
30As a proxy for congestion and relative speed one can look at the number of cars that enter the city
center and at the average speed of city buses (which is only available starting at 5am). The Online
Appendix Figure 13 shows that there is no congestion at night (average speed of buses is between 14
and 16 km/h), while the peak inow of cars is between 8 am and 9 am, which corresponds to the lowest
average speed for public buses (8 km/h). At 7 am, 1 pm, and 7 pm the inow of cars into the city center
is close to 5000 cars every half hour, and the average speed of public buses is close to 10 km/h. The inow
of cars might be a poor proxy of congestion in the afternoon when most cars drive out of the city. In
the evening the average speed of public buses starts increasing at 6pm, but overall shift change intervals
during daytime are not subject to exceptional congestion.
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5 Testing for Deterrence
There are several statistics that could signal the presence of deterrence related to shift
changes. Deterrence would lead to dierences in the distribution, composition, as well as
evolution of robberies.
5.1 Distribution of Robberies and Congestion
Let us start with the distribution. The distribution of robberies by time of the day shows
that the excess mass is driven by robberies that happen when businesses are about to
close, around both lunch time and dinner time (see Figure 5, time goes from 0 to 24).
Most business are only open during the day, typically between 8 am and 8 pm, which is
when most robberies take place.31
5.1.1 Congestion
Shift changes are close to such spikes, and thus one might worry that the productivity of
the police patrols suer because of congestion. Yet, since there is on average less than one
robbery in each shift (exactly 0.375), this channel is unlikely to be an important one.32
A simple way to test for congestion is to restrict the analysis to the set of rst robberies
of the day.
If in a given day the police ocers are busy investigating the rst robbery, for the
subsequent ones the productivity may be harmed. This would be particularly troublesome
in case of congestion. Table 6 computes the shift change eects focussing on the very rst
robbery of the day that a given police force has to deal with. If anything, congestion
appears to bias the eects towards zero.
31Figure 6 shows the distribution for major crime categories.
32In order to see whether other crimes produce congestion eects during shift changes, I use the
average daily number of thefts in 15 minute intervals that happened between 2009 and 2010 in Milan.
These tables are based on the ocial police reports collected by the Central Police Department in Rome
(Servizio Analisi Criminale). The daily number of thefts are shown in Figure 6. I reduce the heaping at
[0-14] minute and [30-44] minute intervals shown in the Online Appendix Figure 15 distributing a mass
proportional to the relative degree of heaping to the [15-29] and [45-59] minute intervals. The assumption
is that over the entire day thefts are uniformly distributed over the four 15-minute intervals. While there
are on average only 1.5 robberies each day, every 15 minutes there are about 3 thefts. None of the average
number of thefts shows a clear spike during shift changes. The numbers are typically higher either before
or after the shift changes. Bag-snatching and pick-pocketing crimes tend to be high during the entire day,
while burglaries spike in the morning when victims are likely to realize the theft. Other kinds of thefts
spike around 8pm. I would like to thank Ernesto Savona from Transcrime, the Joint Research Centre on
Transnational Crime, for sharing these data.
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5.1.2 Distribution
In the absence of congestion, a mass around shift changes might still signal that criminals
know about potential police disruptions around shift changes.33 And if the more knowl-
edgable robbers were also the more able ones, heterogeneity in knowledge would generate
heterogeneity in ability, which might bias the shift change eects downward.
Before running the regressions it is useful to look at the histogram of the the time
centered around shift changes. Figure 7 shows the histogram in 15 minute bins of the
event time (left panel) and of the absolute value of event time (right panel). Taking
the absolute value collapses the potential jump 15 minutes before shift changes (the rst
vertical line, -0.25) and the potential jump 15 minutes after shift changes (the second
vertical line, +0.25) into one potential jump (+0.25). In line with the time of the day
histogram (Figure 5) there is evidence of a discontinuity at -0.25 and at +0.25, but no
matter which histogram one looks at, the direction of the jump is opposite of the one that
(lack of) deterrence would generate.
That none of these changes appear to be related to an endogenous response of robbers
is more readily visible when one exploits the heterogeneity based on distance from the
headquarters. Unobserved conditions faced by robbers (i.e. the exact opening time of
businesses, the visibility on the street and inside the business premises due to weather
conditions, sunlight, etc.) as well as their individual constraints (i.e. their working hours
in legitimate jobs, etc.) could be contributing to such drop. Since these conditions and
constraints are not changing with the distance from the headquarters and the police
disruptions were concentrated far from the headquarters, a dierence-in-dierences test
is a more powerful one.
Figure 8 shows the two histograms conditional on whether the businesses are below or
above the median distance from the headquarters. There are no major dierences between
the two histograms.
Next, in order to generate a single test statistic I mimic the analysis performed for
the likelihood of clearing a case, estimating Equation 2 and 3 using the number of rob-
beries as the dependent variable. Whether these dierences are signicant is shown in
Table 7. The table presents Poisson model estimates of shift change eects, where the
dependent variable is the number of robberies aggregated by 15 minute periods (there are
96 such periods), by area (north-east, north-west, south), by median distance from the
headquarters (HQ), and by shift change day type (from 1 to 3). There are a total of 1,656
observations. All estimates can be interpreted as semi-elasticities. While there is some
33Evidence that thefts and burglaries do not cluster around shift changes is shown in Figure 6.
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evidence that robberies spike around shift changes when compared to control periods (in
the event study approach the control period is 1 hour and 15 minutes from the shift change
interval), there is no evidence that during shift changes robbers are more likely to target
businesses that are located farther away from the headquarters, which is when and where
the entire disruption takes place. Columns 3 and 4 show that the number of robberies
does not dier depending on whether the Polizia maintains control over the area (smooth
changeover).
5.2 Balance Tests
While one can rule out that congestion is driving the reduction in police performance
during shift changes, or that during such police disruption robbers try to target businesses
that are located far from the police headquarters, balance tests can tell us whether those
who do select the right time and place appear to be more able criminals. Beyond making
a safe escape, the other most important measure of success is the value of the loot.
While the summary statistics table showed that the loot, as well as the other charac-
teristics of robbers and robberies during shift changes dier little with respect to the rest
of the day, there might still be discontinuities close to the shift changes. The upper panel
of Table 8 performs the test for discontinuities for covariates around the shift change,
using the Fourier as well as the ±1h15min before and after shift change sample. The
lower panel shows the dierence-in-dierences estimate, where the additional dierence
is based on whether the distance between the victim and the headquarters is above the
median.
The simple dierences coincide with the dierences shown in the summary statistics
(Table 1). Even the dierence-in-dierences show little evidence of ability dierence, and
they typically go in the opposite direction: robbers are less likely to be armed, and the
groups of robbers tend to be smaller.
Arguably the single most important variable to measure ability is the value of the
stolen good, and average dierences might hide some heterogeneity (Bitler et al., 2006,
see). Figure 9 displays the whole cumulative distribution functions depending on the shift
change status focussing on robberies that happen close to shift changes (±1h15m). Using
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test one cannot reject that the two distribution functions are the
same.
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5.3 Summary of Additional Tests
For brevity several additional deterrence tests are in the Appendix Section A.3. In short,
there is no evidence that robbers who have the ability to be more unpredictable, because
they target businesses that are less clustered in space, are more likely to target shift
changes. There is also no evidence of learning about the opportunity given by shift
changes: robbers who targeted a shift change are not more likely to target it in later
robberies. There is also no evidence that the shift change eects are closer to zero for
robbers who for the rst time target a shift change, and therefore are less likely to be part
of a selected group of more knowledgable and possibly able robbers.
6 Deterrence vs. Incapacitation
To understand how changes in clearances translate into dierences in crime rates, and
what kind of assumptions are needed to establish more general ndings, I start with an
individual model of crime where criminals can potentially repeatedly commit crimes.34 At
time t an individual decides to commit a crime when his/her expected utility from doing
so is positive, (1− π)U − πD − ut > 0, where π is the perceived clearance rate (which
may depend on the true clearance rate c and on the level of policing p: π (c (p) , p)). U is
the utility from the loot, and D the disutility from spending S years in prison; ut is the
opportunity cost from committing a crime at time t (e.g. legal earnings). The likelihood
of committing a crime is
Ft = Ft (U − π (D + U)) ,
where Ft is the cumulative distribution function of ut. With yearly data and no repeat
oending within the year F represents the crime rate.35 But within a year, ut is likely
to be fairly persistent for the same individual (for example, due to long term unemploy-
ment), and each year there could be multiple crime opportunities. This introduces repeat
oending.
In the extreme case of full persistence within the year Ft = F , and if there is a large




F (1− c)t ≈ F
c
. (5)
34With the exception of repeat oenses the setup is similar to the one used by Durlauf et al. (2010)).
35When aggregate crime regressions are linear in clearance rates c, researchers are implicitly assuming
that the errors (the outside opportunities) are uniformly distributed.
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Potential criminals start oending with probability F and move to a second crime
if not arrested, which happens with probability 1 − c. The probability of committing a
third oense is (1 − c)2 etc. The implied assumption for this formula is that in case of
arrest the incapacitation lasts longer than a year. Both assumptions are reasonable when
dealing with robbers. Their sentences tend to be between 3 and 4 years and there is
strong evidence of repeat oending within the year.36
The incapacitation eect 1/c in Equation 5 gives rise to a strong convex relationship
between crime rates and clearance rates.37 38
Figure 10 plots 20 years of yearly province level aggregate crime rates for robberies and
for motor vehicle thefts against the corresponding clearance rates (dened as the number
of cleared crimes over the total number of crimes in a year). The relationship is strongly
convex, and the simple re-scaled prediction based on the incapacitation eect 1/c ts the
data quite well.39
In order to evaluate the relative strength of incapacitation and deterrence I can express
the elasticity of crime with respect to police εC,p as the product between the elasticity of
crime with respect to clearance rates εC,c (which potentially contains both, an incapac-
















In the absence of deterrence, or if F does not depend on c, from Equation 5 εC,c = −1
and εC,p = −εc,p, meaning that the eect of police on crime is completely driven by how
additional police resources translate into increased clearance rates.
Without information on the exact number of active police patrols I cannot measure the
reduction in policing during shift changes, but according to the Police Union the average
36The upper quartile time dierence between crimes organized by the same robbers is two weeks,
meaning that by extrapolation 75 percent of robbers would organize more than 26 robberies in a year.
37Several functional forms have been used in the literature to model crime as a function of clearance
rates. Levitt (1998) and Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) use a log-log specication, Machin and Meghir
(2004) use a probability odds-log specication, and Mustard (2003) uses a log-level specication.
38For the deterrence eect driven by F , convexity or concavity depend on how π depends on police
presence and on the shape of the density of u around the marginal criminal.
39On a related note, trying to measure incapacitation using the relationship between arrests and policing
would be a mistake. As Levitt and Miles (2004) and Owens (2011) point out, the theoretical predictions
about arrest rates are ambiguous. More policing can potentially reduce the arrests in case of deterrence
as well as increase them in case of incapacitation. Since Evans and Owens (2007) show that the COPS
program reduced overall crime, while Owens (2011) nds no eect of such a program on arrests, there is
arguably indirect evidence that deterrence and incapacitation are both present.
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number of working cars is 25, while cars on patrol range between 15 and 20.40 This means
that between 1/3 to 2/3 of patrolling cars need to perform the shift change inside the
headquarters. Taking the conservative estimate of a 2/3 reduction in police presence we
need to divide our intention to treat eect of -0.05 by 2/3 to get an average treatment
eect ( ∂c
∂p
) of -0.075. Dividing this number by the average clearance rate (15 percent) we
get that the elasticity εc,p is equal to 0.5. To assess the importance of incapacitation we
now need an estimate of εC,p.





= −0.56, and is in line with Chaln and McCrary (2018)'s preferred estimate.
Other elasticity estimates are more negative (-1.34 in Evans and Owens (2007), -1.86 in
Lin (2009) and -1.20 in Levitt (1997)).
While any reduction in total elasticity, driven for example by measurement error bias
in police numbers, would lower the importance of incapacitation over deterrence, a total
elasticity of -0.56 implies that incapacitation is the main driver for robbery reductions
when police numbers increase.
7 Conclusions
Using precise micro-level information about robberies against businesses, coupled with
some peculiar rules about shift changes, this paper shows that disrupting police patrolling
reduces the likelihood of clearing a robbery (i.e. arresting at least one of the perpetrators).
Since most of the robbers are professional criminals who tend to re-oend on a weekly
basis (see Mastrobuoni, 2016), the disruptions generate sizeable negative incapacitation
eects.
A battery of dierent tests for selection and deterrence suggests that most robbers
are completely unaware of these disruptions. This might be partly due to the fact that,
except for the time when there is a shortage of police cars and such cars are physically
inside the police headquarters, police cars remain visible.
What can be learned from such a specic low-visibility quasi-experimental change in
policing? If criminals are aware of typical, business as usual, policing levels, the ultimate
eect on crime of such policing would most likely be a combination of deterrence and
incapacitation. In much the same way, following a terrorist attack, continuously guarding
specic areas is likely to produce an upper bound of deterrence and a lower bound of
40The Polizia keeps records about the outgoing and incoming police cars for two weeks before destroying
such information, but would not disclose such information. The Carabinieri do not disclose their numbers,
but if they are proportional to the number of Polizia cars they should have around 10 cars.
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incapacitation compared to a typical police ocerwho is neither constantly guarding
a building,41 nor constantly driving around the citythe Milan shift-changes are likely to
produce opposite bounds. The typical' police ocer is likely to be less predictable than
a stationing ocer, and more predictable than one that is rotating during shift changes.
In terms of policy implications, this paper highlights an issue related to shift changes.
During these changes businesses located far away from the headquarters need more pa-
trolling. To eliminate the shift change eects the Italian law prescribes shift changes out
on the street, which requires twice the active number of police cars. A less costly and
more realistic strategy to reduce disruption would be to have overlapping shift changes.42
Another strategy would be to set the shift changes at times when the lowest number
of crimes are committed (the Online Appendix Section A.2 computes an optimal shift
change regime).
To better understand whether Milan's patrolling levels are suboptimal, as well whether
disregarding the shift change rule is generating welfare losses, I start by imputing the cost
of additional police cars. The per unit price tag on the last batch of SEAT Leon police cars
was e43,897, about $50,000. Assuming that the car drives 100,000km per year (this would
mean that the car runs for about 12 hours each single day and drives at an average speed
of 25kph (15mph) when in service) and becomes obsolete after 10 years, with a yearly
cost of insurance (e2,000), depreciation (e4,500), gas (e4,000) and repairs (e3000), the
cost of the car would be about e13,500 per year.
With two additional drivers that are paid average police wages, the total cost would
increase to about e50,000. A 20 percent increase in police patrols, from 30 to 36, would
thus cost about e300,000 per year. Regarding shift changes, if these cars were sitting in
the garage in need of repairs, the depreciation cost would have to be excluded, and so
would be the cost for the drivers. The yearly additional cost would be only e56,000.
Based on the estimated elasticities, a 20 percent increase in patrols leads to a 10
percent increase in clearance rates, from 15 to 16.5 percent. This would reduce the
expected number of robberies committed by each repeat oender before an arrest takes
place by 0.6. Given that every year about 85 new repeat oenders start robbing businesses,
an average of 51 robberies are prevented.
Additional arrests may also increase judicial spending. With respect to repeat of-
fenders, this study suggests that most prolic oenders will eventually end up in prison.
In other words, with decently sized clearance rates (1 − c)t converges to 0 reasonably
41As in Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), Klick and Tabarrok (2005) and Draca et al. (2011).
42For example, half of the Pittsburgh Police units change at a specic time, the other half one hour
later.
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quickly, and improved clearance rates only anticipate the time of arrest, with little eect
on spending. As for the cost of arresting the marginal one time oender, while such
cost is harder to pin down, it also tends to be smaller because of sentence suspensions,
probation, etc. that many countries, including Italy, have in place for rst time oenders.
Evaluated at the average haul the 51 fewer robberies reduce social losses by about
e143,000.43 For shift changes this already outweighs the cost, which implies that the
Italian police forces should invest in maintaining a sucient number of working police
cars to avoid disruptive shift changes.
It does not cover the full cost of 6 additional patrols, but indirect losses (Cook, 2009)
and reduced losses for other types of crime are likely to overturn this result.44
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Figure 1: Headquarters' location
Notes: The black dot indicates where the Polizia
and the Carabinieri headquarters are located. The
squares and crosses indicate the location of
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Figure 2: Geographic Distribution of Robberies by Group
Notes: Groups are dened based on the exact day and time of a robbery. Coordinates use Gauss-Boaga
projections.
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Figure 4: Shift Change Treatment and Placebo Eects on Clearance Rates
Notes: Each dot represents a dierent coecient, and the corresponding vertical lines the 95 percent
condence intervals (based on clustered, by series, standard errors). Event time measures the time (in
hours) from shift changes ranging from -2.5 hours to +2.5 hours. The estimate corresponding to the
event time 0 corresponds to the correct shift change (centered at 12 am, 7 am, 1 pm, 7 pm). There is
one estimate for each placebo (event time 6= 0) shift change shifted by 30 minutes forward or backward.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Robberies
Notes: The histogram uses 15 minute bins.
The darker vertical intervals indicate the
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Figure 6: Average Number of Daily Thefts in
15 Minute Intervals
Notes: Based on 93 percent of all thefts that
occurred in in Milan between 2009 and 2010. The
series has been smoothed to reduce heaping. Data
about reported thefts have been provided to
Transcrime (Joint Research Centre on
Transnational Crime) by the Servizio Analisi
Criminale (Crime Analysis Department) of the
Italian Ministry of the Interior within the
framework of the project Crime in Metropolitan
Areas. Vertical lines indicate the half-hour shift
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Figure 7: Distribution of Event Time and Absolute Value of Event Time
Notes: Event time measures the time (in hours) from shift changes ranging from -3 hours to +3 hours.
The absolute value of event time is shown in the right panel. Histograms use 15 minute bins. The
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Figure 8: Absolute Value Event Time His-
tograms by Distance from Headquarters and
by Smoothness of the Shift Change
Notes: Histograms use 15 minute bins. The darker
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Figure 9: Cumulative Distribution of the Loot
Notes: The sample is based on robberies that happen within 1 hour and 15
minutes from the shift changes. The loot has been truncated at e10,000. The
p-value of the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of
distribution functions without truncation is 16.7 percent.
Figure 10: Aggregate Robbery Rates and
Clearance Rates
Notes: The dashed line simply plots the inverse of
the clearance rate. Based on 103 Italian provinces
between 1983 and 2003.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Shift change Dierence
Yes No
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Err.
Characteristics of the investigators
Cleared robbery 0.091 0.288 0.148 0.355 -0.057 0.019***
Polizia (Police) 0/1 0.745 0.436 0.730 0.444 0.015 0.026
Predictive policing (Keycrime) 0.249 0.433 0.234 0.424 0.015 0.027
Distance from the headquarters (in minutes) 14.762 4.095 14.246 4.457 0.516 0.276
Distance from the headquarters (in kilometers) 6.024 2.134 5.756 2.275 0.268 0.148
Characteristics of the robberies
Amount stolen in euros 2814.365 12335.651 2862.969 10950.471 -48.604 966.598
Shops' closing time 0/1 (90th percentile) 0.102 0.303 0.178 0.383 -0.076 0.020***
Shops' closing time 0/1 (maximum) 0.048 0.214 0.088 0.283 -0.039 0.015***
Southern area 0.428 0.495 0.436 0.496 -0.008 0.030
North-Western area 0.334 0.472 0.350 0.477 -0.015 0.029
Year 2009.246 1.030 2009.239 1.021 0.008 0.064
Month 6.074 3.800 5.838 3.698 0.236 0.235
Day of the week 3.278 1.921 3.228 1.809 0.050 0.112
Characteristics of the robbers
Serial robbers 0.629 0.484 0.574 0.495 0.055 0.031
Number of the series 6.048 8.106 4.916 6.605 1.133 0.498
Average age 26.616 11.777 26.558 12.599 0.058 0.720
Ages are unknown 0.085 0.279 0.104 0.306 -0.019 0.018
Firearm 0/1 0.258 0.438 0.224 0.417 0.033 0.030
At least one knife, but no rearm 0.110 0.314 0.089 0.285 0.021 0.019
Number of robbers 1.592 0.647 1.567 0.729 0.025 0.042
Some Italian 0.799 0.401 0.786 0.410 0.013 0.026
N. obs. 353 1,814
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Table 2: Event Time Study of Clearance Rates
(1) (2) (3)
Cleared Robbery (0/1)
30 min. shift change interval (SCI) -0.045** -0.050** -0.044**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
30 min. SCI shifted by +1.5h 0.013 0.007 0.004
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
30 min. SCI shifted by -1.5h 0.032 0.027 -0.022
(0.040) (0.040) (0.042)
30 min. SCI shifted by +2h 0.051* 0.048 0.009
(0.030) (0.030) (0.033)
30 min. SCI shifted by -2h -0.004 -0.011 -0.021
(0.028) (0.029) (0.030)
30 min. SCI shifted by +2.5h 0.014 0.007 -0.009
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
30 min. SCI shifted by -2.5h 0.043 0.037 0.009
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Shops' closing time 0/1 (90th percentile) -0.029 -0.028
(0.021) (0.023)
Shops' closing time 0/1 (maximum) 0.011 0.026
(0.029) (0.030)
Other Xs No No Yes
Constant 0.136*** 0.143*** 0.311***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.072)
Observations 2167 2167 2167
R-squared 0.006 0.007 0.062
Notes: Linear probability model of clearing the case with clustered (by series)
standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The SCI
dummy variable is equal to one if the robbery happened in the following time
intervals: 6.45am-7.15am, 12.45pm-1.15pm, 6.45pm-7.15pm,
11.45pm-12.15am. The excluded time period is the 1h15min period preceding
and 1h15min following the SCI. The other Xs are the value of the stolen loot,
a police dummy, a dummy for robbers with some experience, the predictive
policing dummy, a south and a north-west dummy, year by month dummies,
day of the week dummies, age, age squared, a dummy when age is missing, a
rearm dummy, a knife dummy, the number of perpetrators, and whether
some of the robbers appeared to be Italian.
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Table 3: Clearance Rate Regressions Controlling for Semi-parametric Functions
of Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cleared Robbery (0/1)
Fourier series Quartic in time Cubic spline
Shift change 0/1 -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.043** -0.041**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Constant 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.156* 0.154* 0.158* 0.158*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.080) (0.080) (0.085) (0.085)
Shops closing FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2167 2167 2167 2167 2167 2167
R-squared 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.011
Notes: Linear probability model of clearing the case with clustered (by series) standard errors
in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Fourier series contains 2 sine and 2
cosine terms (the optimal size based on cross-validation) and the cubic splines is based on 7
equally distanced knots. Online Figure 12 shows the unconditional smoothed function f(t).
Table 4: Dierence-in-Dierences: Heterogeneity by Distance from the HQs and Shift
Change Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cleared Robbery (0/1)
Shift change int. above median time from the HQ -0.077*** -0.073**
(0.028) (0.032)
Shift change int. below median time from the HQ -0.002 -0.009
(0.027) (0.029)
Below median time from Police HQ -0.035** -0.024
(0.016) (0.023)
Shift change in non-retained area -0.039* -0.038
(0.022) (0.025)
Shift change in retained area -0.050 -0.062
(0.040) (0.043)
Retained area 0.012 0.028
(0.020) (0.027)
Other Xs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fourier series Yes No Yes No
30' Event time dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 2167 2167 2167 2167
p-value for the dierence between the shift change eects 0.0532 0.137 0.819 0.633
R-squared 0.067 0.066 0.064 0.066
Notes: Linear probability model of clearing the case with clustered (by series) standard errors in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for the same regressors used in
Column 3 of Table 2. Fourier regressions control for 2 sine and 2 cosine functions of time, while the
Event time regressions control for 12 interacted 30 minute event time dummies.
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Table 5: Individually Dened Shift change Period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cleared Robbery (0/1)
Turnover eects with Fourier `±1h15m'
κ = 10/10 -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.046** -0.051**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022)
κ = 11/10 -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.050** -0.054***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
κ = 12/10 -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.058***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
κ = 13/10 -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.052*** -0.056***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
κ = 14/10 -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.044** -0.047**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
κ = 15/10 -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.046** -0.049***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Other Xs No Yes No Yes
Observations 2167 2167 1316 1316
Notes: Each coecient measures the eect of a shift change period and refers to a dierent
regression. These estimates exploit information on the exact location of the incident, and
Google's predicted duration τ of driving from the Carabinieri or the Polizia headquarters to
such location. Given that Google's estimated durations for Italy do not take trac into
account one can multiply such number by a constant that is larger or equal to 1:
Yi,n = α+ δI(|ti,n − T | ≤ κτi,n) + f(ti,n)εi,n. Fourier regressions control for 2 sine and 2
cosine functions of time, while the ±1h15m regressions use only robberies that happen within
1 hour and 15 minutes from the shift changes (in line with the event study dummies). Linear
probability model of clearing the case with clustered (by series) standard errors in






Shift change 0/1 -0.073***
(0.022)
Individual shift change κ = 12/10 -0.078***
(0.022)
30 min. shift change interval (SCI) -0.073***
(0.024)
30 min. SCI shifted by +1.5h 0.052
(0.054)
30 min. SCI shifted by +2h 0.045
(0.050)
30 min. SCI shifted by +2.5h 0.031
(0.037)
30 min. SCI shifted by -1.5h -0.006
(0.041)
30 min. SCI shifted by -2h 0.009
(0.043)
30 min. SCI shifted by -2.5h 0.017
(0.039)
Constant 0.163*** 0.164*** 0.148***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 1,297 1,297 1,297
R-squared 0.013 0.014 0.010
Notes: For each day and for each police force the sample is restricted to
the very rst robbery. See Table 2 for a description of the regressors.
Subsequent robberies are excluded. The Fourier regressions control for 2
sine and 2 cosine functions of time. Linear probability model of clearing
the case with clustered (by series) standard errors in parentheses: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Number of Robberies
(1) (2)
Number of Robberies
Shift change interval (SCI) 0.401** 0.220
(0.193) (0.280)
SCI shifted by +1.5h -0.943***
(0.190)
SCI shifted by -1.5h -0.228
(0.163)
SCI shifted by +2h -0.591***
(0.192)
SCI shifted by -2h -0.296*
(0.170)
SCI shifted by +2.5h -0.419**
(0.172)
SCI shifted by -2.5h -0.678***
(0.215)
Intervals interacted with: Above Median Distance from HQ
Shift change interval (SCI) 0.166 0.158
(0.219) (0.362)
SCI shifted by +1.5h -0.111
(0.251)
SCI shifted by -1.5h 0.031
(0.221)
SCI shifted by +2h -0.440
(0.269)
SCI shifted by -2h -0.354
(0.236)
SCI shifted by +2.5h -0.130
(0.225)
SCI shifted by -2.5h 0.363
(0.280)





Fourier series Yes No
Within 1h15min from SC No No
Observations 1,656 1,656
Notes: Poisson model of the number of robberies aggregated by 30
minute periods, by area (north-east, north-west, south), by median
distance from the headquarters (HQ), and by shift change day type
(from 1 to 3). Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. See Table 2 for a description of the regressors.
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Table 8: Balance Tests
Simple Dierences
Fourier `±1h15min'
δ̂ se(δ̂) δ̂ se(δ̂)
Loot in e1,000 0.091 0.681 0.075 0.720
Average age -0.114 0.803 0.189 0.813
Ages are unknown -0.009 0.019 -0.017 0.018
Firearm 0/1 0.049 0.031 0.052 0.031
At least one knife, but no rearm 0.007 0.015 0.007 0.015
Number of robbers 0.065 0.044 0.077 0.043
Some Italian -0.003 0.025 0.011 0.025
Shops' closing time 0/1 (90th percentile) -0.161 0.024*** -0.118 0.022***
Shops' closing time 0/1 (maximum) -0.121 0.018*** -0.080 0.016***
Police 0/1 0.010 0.026 0.017 0.025
Southern area -0.069 0.029 -0.055 0.029
North-Western area -0.041 0.030 -0.037 0.028
Dierence-in-Dierences Based on Distance
Loot in e1,000 -1.131 2.150 -0.296 2.171
Average age 3.012 1.395** 3.279 1.372**
Ages are unknown -0.052 0.033** -0.052 0.032
Firearm 0/1 -0.029 0.052 -0.005 0.053
At least one knife, but no rearm -0.051 0.036 -0.073 0.035**
Number of robbers -0.115 0.077 -0.124 0.075*
Some Italian 0.050 0.047 0.068 0.045
Shops' closing time 0/1 (90th percentile) 0.088 0.046* 0.088 0.037**
Shops' closing time 0/1 (maximum) 0.049 0.035* 0.036 0.027
Police 0/1 0.087 0.054 0.030 0.051
Southern area -0.032 0.058 -0.022 0.057
North-Western area -0.022 0.062 -0.012 0.059
Notes: Each row corresponds to a dierent linear regression with the dependent variable
listed on the left. The simple dierence is the coecient on the shift change dummy.
The dierence-in-dierences is the coecient on the interaction between the shift change
dummy variable and the Above Median distance dummy variable. Fourier regressions
control for 2 sine and 2 cosine functions of time, while the ±1h15m regressions use only
robberies that happen within 1 hour and 15 minutes from the shift changes (in line with
the event study dummies). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A Appendix
A.1 Optimal choice of k
To avoid overtting one can either use the Akaike Information Criterion, which penalizes
the likelihood function increasingly as more and more sine and cosine terms are added,
or cross-validation, which rests on out of sample predictions. In particular, to predict the
outcome of observation i one uses all the other N − 1 observations, repeating the exercise
for all N observations.45 Table 10 shows that using this simple but slow leave-one-out
cross-validation method, k = 2 minimizes the cross-validation mean squared as well as
the AIC objective function.
A.2 Optimal timing of shift changes
If robberies were the only crime, one would like to have shift changes when most businesses
are closed and robberies are rare. The fraction of robberies that fall within a 30 minute
shift change period can be drastically reduced from about 15 to about 2.5 percent by
deferring all shift changes by just one and a half hours (1.30am, 8.30am, 2.30pm, 8.30pm).
One can estimate that the corresponding reduction in the expected number of robberies
would be close to 6 percent. The change is small but could become much larger if criminals
started exploiting these ineciencies.46
A.3 Additional Tests for Deterrence
A.3.1 Correlation between ability and shift change targeting
The rst two tests use very detailed information on the timing of the robbery but no
information about their evolution. Exploiting the panel structure of the data delivers
additional tests for selection. These tests are designed to look for evidence of learning,
45See (Newey et al., 1990) for a similar application of cross-validation.








t,0, where pt,i = 0.865 + 0.05I(|t − Ti| ≤ 15) represents
the probability of success of a robbery, which depends on whether the robbery happened during a shift
change period (the expected number of robberies for recurrent robbers, meaning robbers who will not
stop robbing banks until caught, when their likelihood of success is p is
∑∞
τ=1 p
τ ). Postponing the shift
changes by 1.5 hours lowers the probability P (|t − Ti| ≤ 15) from 15 percent to 2.5 percent, which can
be gauged using Table 7. For recurrent criminals the expected number of robberies would drop from 6
to 5.6. Given that there are about 260 rst time robbers each year and that 1/3 of these are recurrent
oenders the reduction in the number of crimes per year would be close to 40. Since the average haul is
close to e2,900, one would reduce the total haul by about e100,000 a year.
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testing whether at least some robbers systematically or at least after some time target
business during shift change periods.
One should expect more able robbers to be more likely to target businesses during shift
change periods, and robbers who learn about any disturbance to the patrolling due to shift
changes should become more and more likely to target such periods. The previous section
has shown that variables that related to ability do not vary during shift changes, but the
longitudinal aspect of the data allows one to measure ability in a dierent way. Recurrent
robbers tend to be successful when they manage to behave unpredictably, limiting the
eectiveness of predictive policing. Probably the most prominent unpredictability factor
is the location of the robbery. Robbers who tend to choose business that are located close
to each other are more likely to be caught. This can clearly be seen in the rst panel of
Figure 17. The Figure plots, for each of the 244 groups of robbers who performed at least
2 robberies, the total number of performed robberies against the average distance between
subsequent robberies. Keeping in mind that recurrent robbers tend to rob businesses until
they get caught the total number of business they manage to rob is a good proxy for their
rate of success. Success is clearly positively correlated with the average distance between
subsequent robbed businesses. Regressing the total number of robberies on the average
distance one gets a coecient equal to 0.53 with a standard error of 0.25. Given that the
average distance is equal to 2.45 km (1.5 miles) and the standard deviation is 1.63 km
(1 mile), adding a standard deviation to the average distance increases success by almost
an additional robbery.47. Regressing the total number of robberies on the fraction of
robberies that were done during shift change periods one again gets a coecient which is
positive and signicant. A standard deviation increase (0.20) in the fraction of robberies
performed during shift change periods has almost the same eect as a standard deviation
increase in the average distance. If choosing a shift change and choosing the distance
between targets were deliberate choices and were both signaling a higher degree of ability,
one would expect the two measures to be correlated with each other. Panel 3 of Figure 17
shows that this is not the case. The regression line is at and if anything has a negative
slope.48
47Running a log-log regression the estimated elasticity is signicantly dierent from 0 and larger than
20 percent.
48Inverting the regression the results are the same, there is no signicance and the slope is negative.
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A.3.2 Learning about shift changes
It could still be that robbers learn over time about the opportunities that arises during
shift change. If this were the case one would expect these robbers to start targeting such
periods. The easiest way to see this is to observe the evolution of the time chosen by the
individual oenders across robberies. The 9 panels of Figure 19 show the evolution of the
time chosen by the 9 most prolic groups of robbers.49 Not only is there little evidence
of convergence (learning), but for 7 out of 9 most prolic oenders less than one in three
robbery falls inside a turnover period (individually dened as in Table 5 with κ = 1.2).
In order to see whether the persistence in the chosen time of the day that is visible
around shift changes represents an anomaly, one can estimate whether the probability
of organizing a robbery during an event time period depends on having organized the
previous robbery during the same event time period. Using once again a linear probability
model, I regress the event time dummy Γci,n on the event time dummy in the previous
robbery Γci,n−1. Given the autoregressive nature of the regression I do not control for the
Fourier series, but in line with the event studies, I select the sample to be within 1 hour
and 15 minutes around the chosen event time. Figure 18 shows that the shift changes
(event time 0) do not show autoregressive coecients that are any dierent from the other
event times.
Finally, another simple way to directly test whether the results are driven by selection
is to compute the shift change eect on the sample of oenders who have never before
organized a robbery during a shift change. For these robbers a shift change eect is less
likely to be the product of ability. Table 11 shows that there is no evidence that with this
sample selection the shift change eects disappear, no matter whether the shift change
periods are computed using the 30 minute approximation, or they are computed using
the individual information on the distance from the headquarters. This indicates that as
long as for most robbers the learning is not sudden and discontinuous, selection does not
explain the dierences in clearance rates.
49The 9 groups of robbers organize about 15 percent of all robberies, and all the previous results are
robust to the exclusion of these most prolic groups of robbers.
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Figure 11: Aggregate Crime Rates and the Corresponding Clearance Rates
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Figure 12: Predicted Clearance Rates
Notes: Clearance rates based on dierent smoothers. The
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Figure 13: Trac in Milan
Notes: Average speed of public buses in the city center (right
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Figure 14: Geographic Distribution of Robberies by Criminal Group
Notes: The plots are restricted to those groups who performed at least 15 robberies. In each plot the
large black dots indicate the chosen victims by a separate group of robbers. In order to visualize the
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Figure 15: Average Number of Daily Thefts in 15
Minute Intervals
Notes: Based on 93 percent of all thefts that occurred in
Milan between 2009 and 2010. This gure corresponds to
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Figure 16: Event time vs. Time of the Day
Notes: The gures show the observed relationship
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beta=−0.0035, se=0.0076
Figure 17: Unpredictability, Success, and Shift change Periods
Notes: Each plot is based on averages over 244 individual robbers or groups
of robbers who performed at least two robberies. Distances are air travel
distances in kilometers computed using Pythagoras theorem. The average
distance is 2.45 km (sd= 1.64), the average total number of robberies is 6.15
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Figure 18: Autocorrelation of Treatment and Placebo Shift Changes
Notes: Each dot represents a dierent autocorrelation coecient between selecting a shift change or a
placebo shift change and having selected one in the previous robbery. The corresponding vertical lines
measure the 95 percent condence intervals (based on clustered, by series, standard errors). Event time
measures the time (in hours) from shift changes ranging from -2.5 hours to +2.5 hours. The estimate
corresponding to the event time 0 corresponds to the correct shift change (centered at 12 am, 7 am, 1
pm, 7 pm). There is one estimate for each placebo (event time 6= 0) shift change shifted by 30 minutes
forward or backward. In line with the event study, each sample is restricted to 1 hour and 15 minutes
before and after the shift change (placebo or real). The autocorrelation coecients in the right panel
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Figure 19: Individual Time Patterns
Notes: Horizontal lines indicate the 30 minute shift change periods around shifts.
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Table 9: Closing Time of Businesses
90th percentile maximum Freq.
Apparel shops 7:40pm 8:10pm 49
Betting shops 8:02pm 11:00pm 50
Travel agencies 7:45pm 7:45pm 10
Groceries 7:45pm 7:45pm 9
Others 8:00pm 11:45pm 202
Banks 3:45pm 6:10pm 237
Cafes 9:17pm 11:30pm 68
Gas stations 7:55pm 8:20pm 31
Newspaper stands 8:10pm 11:27pm 47
Estheticians 9:20pm 10:30pm 12
Pharmacies 8:00pm 11:55pm 763
Jewelers 6:32pm 7:17pm 24
Hotels 11:00pm 11:46pm 28
Bakeries 7:10pm 7:30pm 11
Phone centers 10:35pm 11:06pm 24
Drugstores 7:45pm 7:45pm 26
Restaurants 11:46pm 11:55pm 33
Supermarkets 8:00pm 10:10pm 348
Tobacco 8:35pm 10:40pm 59
Taxi 10:50pm 11:50pm 14
Phone shops 9:45pm 10:15pm 15
Postal oce 4:05pm 7:10pm 23
Video rentals 11:18pm 11:58pm 61
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Table 10: Choice of Sine and Cosine Terms
sin/cos terms δ se log-likelihood df CV MSE AIC BIC
1 -0.052 0.019*** -762.825 6 11.899% 1537.649 1571.736
2 -0.049 0.019*** -759.917 8 11.891% 1535.834 1581.283
3 -0.040 0.019** -758.308 10 11.897% 1536.617 1593.428
4 -0.034 0.022 -758.074 12 11.919% 1540.148 1608.321
5 -0.036 0.023 -757.456 14 11.937% 1542.913 1622.448
6 -0.048 0.023** -753.273 16 11.914% 1538.545 1629.443
7 -0.035 0.024 -751.095 18 11.915% 1538.189 1640.449
8 -0.029 0.025 -750.634 20 11.935% 1541.268 1654.891
9 -0.029 0.025 -750.615 22 11.960% 1545.229 1670.213
Notes: Each line represents a dierent regression. δ measures the shift change
eect, and se" is the corresponding standard error. Linear probability model
of clearing the case with clustered (by series) standard errors: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. df measures the degree of freedom, CV MSE the mean
squared error in a leave one out cross-validation, and AIC the Akaike
Information Criteria.
Table 11: Shift Change Eects Among Shift Change Entrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cleared Robbery (0/1)
Fourier `±1h15m'
30 minute shift change 0/1 -0.085*** -0.094**
(0.032) (0.036)
Individual shift change κ = 12/10 -0.100*** -0.113***
(0.028) (0.033)
Constant 0.157*** 0.142*** 0.160*** 0.158***
(0.028) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028)
Observations 588 603 323 331
R-squared 0.028 0.029 0.017 0.024
Notes: The sample is restricted to robbers with some experience (at least one robbery) who never
before organized a robbery during a turnover period. Turnover periods are dened using the 30 minute
intervals (Columns 1 and 3) or using the individual measure with κ = 12/10 used in Table 5. The
identication of the shift change eect is based on robbers who for the rst time fall into a shift change
period. Fourier regressions control for 2 sine and 2 cosine functions of time, while the ±1h15m
regressions use only robberies that happen within 1 hour and 15 minutes from the shift changes (in line
with the event study dummies). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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